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Abstract
There is a large literature in behavioral economics contradicting 
the empirical prediction of rational choice theory once 
applied to auctions. The issue is of particular relevance due 
to the large use of auctions in mechanism design. One of 
the heuristics that may induce biased behavior is anchoring, 
namely the possibility that uninformative information 
influences choices. In this article we assess the impact of 
the anchoring effect in bidding for online auctions. Our 
aim is to isolate the anchoring effect of fixed price listing 
from the strategic bidding effect.  Our empirical strategy 
is to use market segmentation induced by the presence of 
counterfeit products.  Our results confirm the importance 
of behavioral heuristics and associate biases in auction. In 
particular we find price effects on auctions from upper and 
lower bounds(ceiling and floor) of the fixed price distribution 
and across run time. The results are robust with regard to 
various formulations of the baseline regression.
Key words:  auction; anchoring; counterfeit, heuristics.
Resumen
Hay una amplia literatura que contradice las predicciones 
empíricas de la teoría de la elección racional aplicada a las 
subastas. El asunto es de mucha relevancia puesto que las 
subastas son muy utilizadas en el diseño de mecanismos. 
Uno de los heurísticos que puede introducir sesgos en los 
comportamientos es el anclaje, o sea la posibilidad que 
información irrelevante tenga influencia en la elección. 
En este artículo medimos el impacto del anclaje en las 
pujas de las subastas en línea. Nuestra estrategia empírica 
consiste en utilizar la segmentación del mercado inducida 
por la presencia de productos falsos. Nuestros resultados 
confirman la importancia de los heurísticos y los sesgos en 
las subastas. En particular, encontramos efectos de precios 
en las subastas desde los límites máximos y mínimos de las 
distribuciones de los precios fijos y a través del tiempo de 
ejecución. Los resultados son robustos a varias formulaciones 
de la regresión básica.
Palabras clave: subastas, anclaje, falsificación, heurísticos.
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The theoretical literature on auctions is based on rational 
choice (Milgrom, 2004), as specified by the assumptions 
underlying the Expected Utility (EU) hypothesis.  The 
Axiomatic foundation of EU is presented in Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944) and critically discussed in Camerer 
and Loewenstein (2003). In particular, given the presence of 
uncertainty, the basic predictions for the auction come from 
the application of the game theoretic concept of sequential 
equilibrium, where cognitive requirements by agents are in 
striking violation of most experimental evidence.  We should 
also mention that even some game theorists have raised 
more than one objection to some of these requirements; for 
instance, with regard to consistency Kreps (1990, p. 430) 
stated that “a lot of bodies are buried in this definition”. 
The issue of how agents behave in an auction framework 
goes beyond the legitimate scientific interest: given the 
typical “competitive” feature of auction, the latter is usually 
proposed as an “implementation” mechanism (Osborne 
& Rubinstein, 1994, chap. 11) to accomplish a target in 
policy setting (i.e. the so called mechanisms design, as 
explained in Milgrom, 2004). A relatively recent case of 
application has been the auction design related with the 
US Treasury’s Rescue Plan (Ausubel & Cramton, 2008). If 
the participant’s behavior is significantly and systematically 
distant from the EU prediction, and if - as discussed by 
Camerer and Fehr (2006) - there is no a priori guarantee 
that the “economic man” dominates other behaviors, 
then the theory’s predictive capability can be seriously 
harmed and its application to the policy contest may lead 
to unattended consequences.
There is now ample literature falsifying the EU 
hypothesis (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2003; Kahneman 
& Thaler, 2006). There are a couple of empirical anomalies 
that we recall here because of the relevance for our discussion.
(1) The hypothesis that the probability judgment follows the 
axiom of Bayesian statistics is systematically contradicted. 
The experimental evidence suggests that subjects tend to 
use heuristics, i.e. rule of behaviors, which allows them 
to prevent their computational and cognitive limitations. 
This type of heuristics is associated with biases, i.e. 
violation of basic statistical rules or of logic, which are 
due to the error of approximation occurring while using 
predefined rules (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
(2) Moreover, experimental evidence suggests that 
preferences do not represent a predefined ordering, 
from which the subject selects their best option given 
the constraints:  as discussed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991), ranking is 
reference dependent, i.e. it tends to be influenced by 
the framing of the situation like presence of a status 
quo or default options etc. (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986) and is “constructed” in relation to the specific 
choice setup (Slovic, 1995).
However, in the domain of auctions, standard theory 
states that personal valuation of the good is known ex ante 
by each participant, probability judgment is consistent 
with Bayesian rules, and, as a result, the bid is the result 
of strategic thinking. As shown by Jones (2011) using 
data from eBay auctions of Amazon.com gift certificates, 
there is evidence supporting the hypothesis of “bidding 
fever” (see also Thaler, 1988), and bidding is often subject 
to anchoring (for other experimental evidence which 
contradicts the prediction of the main theorems, see 
Lucking- Reiley, 1999).
As explained in Chapman and Johnson (2002), anchoring 
has been defined as an anchoring procedure of suggesting a 
salient uninformative number to subjects, an experimental 
evidence that uninformative information influences results 
or, finally, a psychological process through which unrelated 
information affects decision-making. Since we are estimating 
anchoring effects from non-experimental settings, where 
we cannot control all the surrounding variables, we end 
up measuring a reduced form effect; as a result,  the 
interpretation of anchoring we will adhere to is that of the 
second definition, notwithstanding the nature of the data 
used. Anchoring lies –Chapman and Johnson (2002) argue– 
in the activation phase: since the anchor is considered as a 
candidate response, information related with the anchor is 
retrieved and used in the target estimation phase.
If anchoring occurs in auctions, then it may be a 
concern for policymakers: the use of uninformative 
information may be strategically exploited by sellers in 
order to generate overbidding. An empirical investigation 
is necessary since there is large evidence that consumers are 
not fully empowered (Eurobarometer, 2011; European-
Commission, 2011) and because  debiasing can occur 
(Chapman & Johnson, 2002). In fact, policymakers will 
be given the possibility to both regulate online auction 
settings to avoid the exploitation of anchoring effects and/
or design proper debiasing.
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Within the context of online auctioning, a bidder 
is usually given the opportunity to withdraw from the 
auction and buy at a specified price.  There is evidence 
that evaluations are influenced by “fixed price” alternatives 
(Dodonova & Khoroshilov, 2004), but this explanation is 
observationally equivalent to a pure strategic effect: in fact, 
according to standard theory, the fixed price alternative plays 
the role of an outside option and provides information, 
which should be rationally considered in optimal bidding 
(Malmendier & Lee, 2011).  In fact, higher-valued outside 
options theoretically lead to less aggressive bidding than in 
auction models without outside options. Bidders exploit 
outside options by decreasing bids up to the outside option 
value (valuation net of transaction costs). However, empirical 
evidence is challenging also in this matter: the revenue 
equivalence theorem also applies to the case of outside 
options, i.e. the expected revenue for a first-price auction 
equals that for a second-price auction, but laboratory 
evidence documents that the first-price auction generates 
larger revenue than the second-price auction, with and 
without outside option (Cox, Robertson, & Smith, 1982; 
Kirchkamp, Poen, & Reiss, 2009). For those who are not 
familiar, the difference between the first price and second 
price auction is the following: in a first-price auction, bidders 
independently submit a single (sealed) bid, without seeing 
the others’ bids. There is no open, dynamic bidding. The 
bidder who submits the highest bid wins and pays a price 
equal to his/her bid. In a second-price auction, once again 
the bidder who submits the highest bid wins, but here he/
she pays a price equal to the second highest bid (Ockenfels 
et al., 2006). More specifically, these differences - i.e. the 
revenue-premium - increase once outside options are 
introduced but only in first-price auctions.  This is because 
overbidding in first-price auctions is more prominent with 
outside options than without. However, the amount of 
overbidding remains unchanged in second-price auctions 
such as eBay’s.
Whether this outside option price is informative or 
not is then key to understand if anchoring occurs or not.
In this paper, we propose an identification strategy to 
isolate the effect of anchoring from strategic bidding, namely 
through the use of counterfeit. Authentic and counterfeit 
goods are different, clearly separated segments of the market. 
As a result while the effect of fixed price options on auction 
price within the same segment is observationally equivalent 
to a strategic effect, a similar effect across segments can 
be assigned only to anchoring and not to strategic effects. 
In fact, the outside option cannot be meaningful across 
segments (the two objects are not substitutable and the 
price of the other is uninformative).
Our work is strictly connected with the issue of 
identifying behavioral heuristics in auctions, markets and 
other institutional settings. An assessment of anchoring 
effects is in Beggs and Graddy (2009) and Dodonova and 
Khoroshilov (2004), bidding fever has been documented 
by Jones (2011) and Thaler (1988), and the relevance of 
cognitive costs has been investigated by List and Lucking-
Reiley (2002). Railey (2006) presents some evidence on 
the role of reserve price, more in accordance with rational 
choice theory .  The use of market price as reference point 
in a price negotiation is documented experimentally in 
Cristensen and Garling (1997).
The data we use come from an internet auction 
platform.  Some reviews of the empirical literature applied 
to this environment can be found in Ockenfels et al. 
(2006) and Hasker and Sickles (2010). A more general 
review of previous literature regarding field experiments 
and empirical work on auctions is presented by Lucking-
Reiley et al. (2007). 
The technological and economic effect of piracy, 
counterfeit and frauds on online auctions is subject of an 
increasing number of contributions. Most of the strategic 
implications of entry by counterfeit is on the supply side of 
the market (Berger et al., 2012; Qian, 2008, 2010), thus 
further supporting our identification strategy.
In this contribution we use the information on fixed 
price options for auction to isolate the effect of anchoring. 
We use the minimum and maximum fixed price options, 
which are associated empirically with the two segments 
of authentic and counterfeit goods and, we regress them 
separately on counterfeit and authentic goods auction prices. 
We identify anchoring from strategic behavior through the 
cross-segments influence (maximum on counterfeit and 
minimum on authentic).
We find robust evidence of price anchoring in the 
counterfeit segment; we also find anchoring effects for 
the authentic once proper control for price variance is 
introduced.
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Data
Data collection for the study applies a non-participatory, 
observational approach using an “automated sampling 
technique” (Anderson, Friedman, Milam, & Singh 2004) 
on eBay’s German auction platform, i.e. collection of 
involuntary survey data without influencing the participant’s 
behavior. The data gathered on eBay tracks item listings 
(during actual run time) of a homogeneous, health care 
consumer product, starting October 1st, and ending 
November, 30th 2008. In addition, we focused our analysis 
on completed auctions and fixed-price listings. The specific, 
oral care product is a toothbrush head and is of no collectable 
value to buyers. It can be considered a low-price, common 
value good that has no product substitute elsewhere in 
online or offline markets i.e. there is a monopoly producer 
of the authentic product. Table 1 gives summary statistics 
on the dataset.
Table 1
Summary statistics of regressors and 
dependent variable (auction winning bid).
No. of auctioned (fix-price) cases is 816 (247). 
In the subscript, the first letter (a or f) stands
for auction or fixed price listings, t connotes 
(all) listings on a specific day. 
mean stdv. min max
Winning bida (euro) 2.229 .611 .768 13
Minimum pricef ,t (euro) 2.544 .374 1.666 3.58
Maximum pricef ,t (euro) 3.501 .657 2.083 5.747
Counterfeit market sharef ,t .093 .186 0 1
Counterfeit market sharea,t .804 .131 .389 1
Ending on weekday(d)a .582 .494 0 1
No. items solda 13.898 9.004 1 80
Seller ida 64.277 41.257 1 122
Counterfeita .755 .430 0 1
Summary statistics of regressors and dependent variable 
(auction winning bid). No. of auctioned (fix-price) cases is 816 
(247). In the subscript, the first letter (a or f) stands for auction 
or fixed price listings, t connotes (all) listings on a specific day.
Sellers and buyers can match to different market 
mechanisms available online, i.e. auctions or fixed-price 
sales.  The minimum start price on eBay’s auctions is 1 
euro.  The first bid must be at least the starting price and 
additional bidders have to increase the current bit with a 
minimum (or increment) of fifty cents.  The minimum bid 
will be publicly disclosed by the seller and corresponds to 
the public reserve price in auction theory (Ockenfels et al., 
2006).  Every bid entered is a maximum bid to the proxy 
agent. eBay’s proxy agent bids automatically on behalf of 
the bidder and increases the bid in case there are competing 
bids submitted by other bidders.  The participant of the 
auction is outbid if another participant places a higher 
bid (eBay Inc., 2011). The best way to understand the 
mechanisms is through an example we draw from the 
online user manual.  Imagine the current bid for an item 
listed is 5.  Bidder A is this high bidder, and has placed 
a maximum bid of 7 on the item. Her maximum bid is 
kept confidential from all other bidders.  Next, bidder B 
views the item and decides to enter the auction by placing 
a maximum bid of 10. In turn, he becomes the new high 
bidder. eBay’s proxy agent automatically increments bidder 
A’s bid to her maximum of 7, and bidder B’s to 7.50. Bidder 
A then receives an e-mail that she has been outbid. If she 
doesn’t raise her maximum bid before the auction ends, 
bidder B wins the item. 
Multiple bidding on simultaneous eBay listings is 
allowed and it is a common practice.  An alternative 
selling format is fixed price offers, i.e. “pure” Buy-It-Now 
listings. Typically, such listings are integrated into shops 
on eBay and might offer other special features, such as 
service hotlines.  In addition, many of the fixed-price 
offers are issued by professional sellers oftentimes having 
longer-term membership and an explicit business profile. 
The latter status requires disclosure of additional personal 
details but, at the same time, allows for longer duration of 
listings, e.g. auction durations of up to 6 months.  Under 
any selling format, by packaging items, sellers may choose 
to offer purchase of more than one item in a single listing.
Information on counterfeits is provided by a consultancy 
that is commissioned by the authentic good producer and 
specialized on monitoring and on security issues in online 
sales.  The regular examination process of the consultancy 
requires each listing to be opened manually and inspected 
carefully (e.g. description, pictures, seller, sales record etc.). 
This detection strategy is complemented by the use of 
random test purchases. These samples are sent to laboratories 
in order to confirm or rule out counterfeit rating.  Upon 
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confirmation, all further auctions or fixed-price offers are 
removed according to eBay’s VeRO programme. As a result 
the “counterfeit” status is exogenous to the price. In our 
dataset it is captured by a dummy.
The dependent variable we use in the estimation is 
the size of the winning bid in a specific auction listing. 
Maximum (minimum) prices at time t connote the highest 
(lowest) price offer among all daily buy-it-now listings at 
time t. Similarly, counterfeit market shares are calculated 
on the basis of daily auction listing at time t (or, fix-price 
offers on that specific day, respectively).  Furthermore, our 
data assigns the number of sold items per listed auction, 
if the auction ends on a weekday, and if a specific seller 
runs one or multiple auctions (id).
Method
As pointed out in Section 1, our identification strategy 
is based on market separation between authentic and 
counterfeit goods. Empirically, we use the minimum price 
of fixed price market and maximum price (on the same 
day) as proxy for anchors. If the segments are effectively 
separated, then the two refer respectively to counterfeit and 
authentic goods.  In order to assess the role of an anchor, 
we use them as explanatory variables in a regression for 
auction prices (using a set of control variables) separately 
for counterfeits and authentic goods. We call between-
segment effect the effect of minimum price on authentic 
and maximum price on counterfeit and the within segment 
effects those of the minimum on counterfeit and maximum 
on authentic. The between segments effect is an anchoring 
effect, as it cannot be ascribed to strategic behavior, in that 
we could not find any plausible confounding factor, while 
the within segment can be both anchoring and strategic 
behavior.  As a result, the latter cannot be identified, but 
we control it in order to avoid omitted variable bias.
In other words, if the two markets are vertically 
separated, the price signal coming from the outside option 
is informative only inside the segment: since it refers to 
a different, non-substitutable good, it is not meaningful 
outside of its own market. However, psychologically it 
may be recollected and used in the context in which a 
number is exploited as a starting point for the bidding 
strategy and then (usually insufficiently) adjusted. Within 
the segment, the outside option can act both as strategic 
valuable information and anchoring, thus the latter effect 
is not identifiable; between segments we are not aware of 
any other confounding factors and we think it is robust 
to interpret it as anchoring.
Since determination of the counterfeit status is exogenous 
to price, a statistical test of the separation can be carried out 
though a simple mean comparison, controlling for unequal 
variances of the two distributions of prices.  As shown in 
Table 2, counterfeits sell off at significantly lower levels 
than authentic products. This happens under the auction 
mechanism as well as the fixed-price one. In addition, we 
run a number of t-tests in order to further illustrate the price 
characteristics of the data related to product type and the 
sales and cross-mechanism (see Table 2).  Firstly, we find 
that mean prices are significantly higher in fixed-price sales 
than in auction counterpart sales. Lastly, cross-mechanism 
comparison of prices yields significant differences in mean 
prices of authentic products. In contrast, counterfeit prices 
are not significantly different across mechanisms.  Moreover, 
as discussed above the good is a homogeneous one of no 
particular value, which means that differentiation is clearly 
associated with a different quality. 
Table 2
T-tests on mean winning bid/price difference
by and across product type and mechanism 
types. One, two, three stars stand for 
significance at ten, five and one percent. 
Group
mean, 
gr.1
mean, 
gr.2
diff.
(stdv.)
n, gr.1/2
mechanism type
(auction=1, fixed-price=2)
.775 1.046 .271*** 816/247
product types, auction
(counterfeit=1, authentic=2)
.744 .869 .126 616/200
product types, fixed-price
(counterfeit=1, authentic=2)
.797 1.088 .292 36/211
counterfeit across 
mechanisms
(auction=1, fixed-price=2)
.744 .797 .053 616/36
authentic across 
mechanisms
(auction=1, fixed-price=2)
.867 1.088 .219*** 200/211
In order to estimate the effect, we run regression 
separating the samples into the auctions for counterfeit 
goods and the one for authentic goods: technically, we 
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estimate one regression with differentiated coefficients 
for the two groups. Albeit the estimates are identical to 
those obtained by separating the two samples, it is more 
efficient in finite samples.
In order to control for inertial effects and the possibility 
that anchoring occurs in different moments during the time 
span in which the auction is open, we control for lagged 
prices up to the third day before closure (i.e. the average 
duration of an auction in the sample).
In the Appendix we also differentiate the coefficients 
separating between the days in which the share of counterfeits 
is above the average and those on which it is below. When 
the share of the authentic segment is below the average, price 
differences between counterfeit and authentic increases and the 
between segment effect is more likely to be pure anchoring.
Results
eBay’s auction and fixed-price listings are highly related 
online markets. Prices in fixed price listings account for 
a substantial share of auction outcomes. In particular, 
we find significant price effects on auctions from upper 
and lower  bounds (ceiling and floor) of the (fixed) price 
distribution and across time.
More specifically, on the one hand, counterfeit auction 
outcomes are negatively inclined to daily fixed price minima 
at time t-1 (Table 3). Goods offered in fixed price and 
auction markets are close to being perfect substitutes. Thus, 
a price increase in one market should lead to increased 
prices in the other as buyers will migrate to the outside 
option. However, we do not observe any price effects upon 
authentic goods.  On the other hand, ending counterfeit 
auctions are positively inclined to daily fixed price maxima 
on the day the auction ends. Again, we do not observe this 
effect for authentic counterparts.
 
While the minimum fixed price effect on the closing 
price of a counterfeit auction can be associated both to 
anchoring and strategic behavior, the maximum price effect 
is clearly across segments, and can thus be associated with 
price anchoring.
Further analysis accounts for differences in daily 
counterfeit shares and, hence, price variance in markets 
that host anchors as highlighted in Table 4 in the Appendix. 
depending on pooling or separating fixed prices we now 
segregate and review the above price effects.  These estimates 
add three important pieces of evidence.
Firstly, we find that signs from price minima effects on 
counterfeit auctions change with increases of fixed price 
variance at time t. Even though within segments, arguably, 
here this also supports the idea of (cognitive) anchoring as 
it cannot really be explained by rational bidding behavior 
or the outside option. It replicates an anomaly present in 
fixed price markets which is based on the non-monotone 
relationship of price minima to price variance. Regression 
in Table 5 in the Appendix illustrates this relationship 
between price and counterfeit levels and price variance. 
Increases in minima are negatively (positively) correlated 
with 1st (4th) quartile variance while maxima are always 
positively inclined. Interestingly, increasing counterfeit 
shares either have positive or negative association.
Secondly, counterfeit auctions continue to be positively 
inclined to price maxima, independent of fixed price variance. 
Anyhow, effect size differs which, again, echoes monotone 
increases in maxima with variance, likely due to authentic 
seller’s price signaling when fixed-price markets separate.
Lastly, we also find evidence of anchoring for authentic 
good auctions on prices at time t-1 and t-3. Indeed, this effect 
of minima on auctions for authentic goods is clearly between 
segmentss.  In contrast, all remaining significant price effects 
arguably measure strategic bidding, i.e. buyer migration 
from fixed-price markets to auctions, but within segments.
In all model specifications we control for a number 
of additional factors that influence auction outcomes that 
we turn to now.
Basic and extended model specification, counterfeit vs. 
authentic good. DV is the auction’s winning bid at time t. 
One, two, three stars stand for significance at ten, five and 
one percent. In the subscript, the first letter (a or f ) stands for 
auction or fixed price listings, t connotes (all) daily listings 
and cf versus at stand for counterfeit versus authentic.
In general, the willingness to pay depends on average 
quality of goods listed in auctions (Akerlof, 1970). 
Correspondingly, an increasing auction’s counterfeit 
share reduces average bidding outcomes, in particular 
for counterfeited goods. More specifically, bidders with a 
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higher willingness to pay and intention to buy authentic 
goods may migrate to fixed price markets with high price 
variance. Given counterfeit shares in fixed prices increase, 
authentic sellers strategically charge higher prices for their 
good as price signals pay off (Qian, 2010).  In contrast to 
auctions, this provides potential buyers with additional 
information on type and lower risk of mismatch associated 
with purchase. However, in turn, migration decreases 
demand on auctioned items (authentic goods or counterfeit 
goods perceived as authentic) and, hence, leads to lower 
auction outcomes. This is con- firmed by significant, 
negative price effects.
Lastly, sellers of counterfeit products achieve higher 
prices when auctions end on weekdays. This is true for most 
specifications and is arguably due to less time dedicated to 
individual listing inspection by bidders than on weekends. 
Counterfeit sellers with a number of listings and, hence, 
higher risk of being detected and persecuted may not 
attempt to deceive bidders by their listings but wish to 
sell off fast and at lower prices. Similarly, bundling or 
packaging a number of items in a single listing significantly 
reduces per-item auction outcome. This price effect is 
more pronounced and frequent for counterfeit sales than 
for their authentic counterparts.
Discussion
We largely succeed in separating anchoring effects from 
rational bidding in auctions. Nonetheless, a more refined 
analysis of micro-bidding behavior in the presence of 
counterfeits would be desirable for future research.  Data 
available to us is not detailed enough so as to study anchoring 
of individual bids and relative distance of fixed price to 
auction listings on user screens (Malmendier & Lee, 2011). 
Ideally, this would allow for research on how the auction 
mechanism may systematically select anchoring bids and 
bidders as auction winners. In addition, we are not able to 
control for bidder characteristics, e.g., the experience level 
on eBay or average time spent on inspection and decision-
making with regard to bidding. However, Malmendier and 
Lee (2011) do not find any empirical evidence on the role 
of bidder experience for overbidding patterns, which is to 
a certain degree related to price effects from anchoring on 
upper bound  highlighted by this study.
In general, price separation is likely to increase market 
efficiency and consumer welfare on eBay’s fixed price 
Table 3
Basic and extended model specification, 
counterfeit vs. authentic good. DV is the 
auction’s winning bid at time t. One, two, three 
stars stand for significance at ten, five and 
one percent. In the subscript, the first letter (a 
or f) stands for auction or fixed price listings, 
t connotes (all) daily listings and cf versus at 
stand for counterfeit versus authentic. 
Group Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Minimum (ln)price f,t,at –.105 .215 .001 .996
Minimum (ln)price f,t,c f .016 .772 .024 .708
Maximum (ln)price f,t,at –.110 .083 –.035 .672
Maximum (ln)price f,t,c f .096*** .006 .096*** .006
Minimum (ln)price f,t−1,at .015 .836
Minimum (ln)price f,t−1,c f –.133* .027
Maximum (ln)price f,t−1,at –.124 .136
Maximum (ln)price f,t−1,c f .038 .299
Minimum (ln)price f,t−2,at –.080 .433
Minimum (ln)price f,t−2,c f .016 .808
Maximum (ln)price f,t−2,at –.030 .593
Maximum (ln)price f,t−2,c f .030 .417
Minimum (ln)price f,t−3,at .050 .724
Minimum (ln)price f,t−3,c f .124 .080
Maximum (ln)price f,t−3,at .040 .614
Maximum (ln)price f,t−3,c f .074 .144
Counterfeit market
sharea,t,at
–.060 .604 –.031 .807
Counterfeit market
sharea,t,c f
–.506*** .000 –.595*** .000
Counterfeit market
share f,t,at
–.190*** .000 –.170** .003
Counterfeit market
share f,t,c f
.041 .357 .016 .713
Ending on weekday(d)a,t,at –.004 .881 .020 .497
Ending on weekday(d)a,t,c f .043*** .008 .026 .145
No. items solda,t,at –.008** .038 –.007* .045
No. items solda,t,c f –.011*** .000 –.011*** .000
Seller ida,t,at .000 .455 .000 .398
Seller ida,t,c f –.001*** .000 –.001*** .000
Constant 1.215*** .000 1.126*** .000
Adj. R2 .297 .287
No. of cases 816 816
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market in the presence of counterfeits. On the one hand, 
price signals enhance buyers to identify authentic (high-
quality) listings and overcome information asymmetry. 
On the other hand, we find that prices of lower-quality 
counterfeits further decrease when prices separate. Both 
aspects are in line with theory and evidence on price 
effects ex post counterfeit entry in work by Qian (Qian, 
2008, 2010). Anyhow, it should be noted that, from her 
theoretical viewpoint, price signaling may lead to excessive, 
authentic good prices above monopoly ones associated 
with a given quality.
However, once we consider auctions on eBay, consumer 
welfare and market efficiency in the presence of counterfeits 
also depends on bidder’s anchoring.
Here, our analysis (table 4) identifies assimilative 
anchoring on upper bound  and contrastive anchoring on 
lower bound (Ku et al., 2006) in our dataset, i.e. anchors 
having a positive or negative between segment effect on 
winning bids. Assimilative anchoring in counterfeit auctions 
likely echoes fixed-price signals and, thus, increases winning 
bids for low-quality counterfeits.  Bidders on authentic 
auctions experience contrastive anchors which provide 
consumers with high quality at lower cost. Hence, the latter 
(the former) increases (reduces) consumer welfare. Comparing 
size of these effects implies a weak surplus decrease when fixed 
prices separate, and a weak increase when fixed prices pool. 
In sum, however, given the distribution of product types 
in auctions, the welfare decline associated with anchoring 
in counterfeit auctions clearly overcompensates welfare 
increases associated with contrastive anchoring of authentic 
good auctions. Consequently, anchoring in the presence of 
counterfeits reduces overall bidders’ surplus in auctions.
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A. Appendix
Table 4
Extended specifications, coeff. and p-values, 
above/below mean counterfeit fixed-price 
market share. DV is the auction’s winning 
bid at time t. One, two, three stars stand for 
significance at ten, five and one percent. In 
the subscript, the first letter (a or f) stands 
for auction or fixed price listings, t connotes 
(all) daily listings and cf versus at stand for 
counterfeit versus authentic. First Part, it 
continues on the next page extended.
Coeff p-value
Minimum (ln)price f ,t,at,above .062 .805
Minimum (ln)price f ,t,at,below –.099 .408
Minimum (ln)price f ,t,c f ,above –.444*** .007
Minimum (ln)price f ,t,c f ,below .263*** .004
Maximum (ln)price f ,t,at,above –.095 .464
Maximum (ln)price f ,t,at,below –.098 .537
Maximum (ln)price f ,t,c f ,above .431*** .000
Maximum (ln)price f ,t,c f ,below .127** .026
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−1,at,above –.057 .874
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−1,at,below –.181* .060
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−1,c f ,above .075 .777
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−1,c f ,below –.063 .411
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−1,at,above –.205 .107
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−1,at,below –.068 .596
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−1,c f ,above .099 .316
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−1,c f ,below –.043 .397
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−2,at,above –.220 .377
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−2,at,below –.075 .540
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−2,c f ,above .005 .977
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−2,c f ,below .072 .315
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−2,at,above –.057 .653
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−2,at,below .015 .840
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−2,c f ,above –.073 .474
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−2,c f ,below .054 .332
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−3,at,above –.382** .033
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−3,at,below .054 .763
Coeff p-value
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−3,c f ,above .557*** .000
Minimum (ln)price f ,t−3,c f ,below –.064 .447
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−3,at,above .390** .028
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−3,at,below –.009 .921
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−3,c f ,above –.185 .212
Maximum (ln)price f ,t−3,c f ,below .034 .580
Counterfeit market sharea,t,c f –.360*** .007
Counterfeit market sharea,t,at –.161 .158
Counterfeit market sharea,t−1,c f –.139 .168
Counterfeit market sharea,t−1,at –.116 .401
Counterfeit market sharea,t−2,c f –.093 .417
Counterfeit market sharea,t−2,at .293* .097
Counterfeit market sharea,t−3,c f –.207 .119
Counterfeit market sharea,t−3,at .352 .152
Counterfeit market share f ,t,at –.082 .509
Counterfeit market share f ,t,c f –.266*** .001
Counterfeit market share f ,t−1,at –.097* .066
Counterfeit market share f ,t−1,c f .054 .308
Counterfeit market share f ,t−2,at –.081 .519
Counterfeit market share f ,t−2,c f –.191*** .000
Counterfeit market share f ,t−3,at –.037 .583
Counterfeit market share f ,t−3,c f .000 .996
Ending on weekday(d)a,t,at –.060 .176
Ending on weekday(d)a,t,c f .094*** .001
No. items solda,t,at –.006 .100
No. items solda,t,c f –.010*** .000
Seller ida,t,at .000 .272
Seller ida,t,c f –.001*** .000
Constant 1.162*** .000
Adj. R2 .353
No. of cases 816
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Table 5
Price variance regression, coeff. and p-values 
reported. IVs: lower (and upper) bounds of 
the logged fixed price distribution (1st and 4th 
quartile, resp.) and daily counterfeit shares; 
each for standard deviation quartiles. One, two, 
three stars stand for significance at ten, five 
and one percent. In the subscript, the first letter 
(a or f) stands for auction or fixed price listings, 
t connotes (all) daily listings
variance f ,t in fixed prices
Coeff p-value
lower bound, 1st qrt.
(ln)price f ,t,1st –.054*** .000
(ln)price f ,t,2nd –.012 .465
(ln)price f ,t,3rd .027 .135
(ln)price f ,t,4th .072*** .001
upper bound, 4th qrt.
(ln)price f ,t,1st –.025 .122
(ln)price f ,t,2nd –.001 .938
(ln)price f ,t,3rd .027** .013
(ln)price f ,t,4th .075*** .000
Counterfeit market share f ,t,1st –2.643*** .000
Counterfeit market share f ,t,2nd –.305 .388
Counterfeit market share f ,t,3rd .609*** .000
Counterfeit market share f ,t,4th .830*** .000
Constant .149*** .000
Adj. R2 .487
No. of cases 402

